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5 JUL 1977

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, National Reconnaissance Office

SUBJECT: Changes in National Reconnaissance  
Program Security Policy [REDACTED]

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1. [REDACTED] As a result of my review of the Boyce/Lee case, I am directing a number of actions which will impact on various components of the Intelligence Community. Set forth below are specific actions which I am directing that you take within your area of jurisdiction.

a. [REDACTED] The number of access approvals for [REDACTED] projects and [REDACTED] is frozen at the levels of 1 June 1977, effective immediately and continuing until 1 December 1977. Any new access approvals which will not be offset by commensurate debriefings of currently accessed personnel must be endorsed by the Director, National Reconnaissance Office and must have my final approval.

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b. [REDACTED] You should direct all [REDACTED] access approval authorities to review the requirements for [REDACTED] approvals under their jurisdiction and within 90 days reduce the total number of access holders and the number of multiple access approvals among such personnel.

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c. [REDACTED] You should direct all [REDACTED] access approval authorities to initiate immediately a program to discontinue the use of [REDACTED] access approvals in industry settings and to review the use of [REDACTED] access approvals for government personnel with a view toward drastic reduction.

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With reference to this objective, I have asked the Special Security Center of CIA to develop a separate category of access approval for persons who may have temporary custody of sensitive compartmented information, but who have no need to know the substance of the material in their custody (e.g., couriers, guards).

d. [ ] These agencies and departments which provide security support to the various [ ] programs should establish a program for the conduct of periodic, unannounced, comprehensive security surveys of industrial contractor facilities involved in these programs to include unannounced COMSEC inspections of all contractor communications facilities.

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e. [ ] Program managers and their security support components should institute a program within industry to identify those contractor personnel who occupy positions which are in the "high risk" categories. High risk categories include individuals working in such areas as document control, reproduction, courier systems and communications who are afforded broad access to a large volume of classified material; they also include industry personnel who have access to several compartmented programs and program managers or other senior personnel with in-depth knowledge of a particular program.

2. [ ] For your information, I am directing a number of other actions to reduce the number of TALENT-KEYHOLE and COMINT accessed personnel, to review the Community's adherence to the intent of DCID No. 1/14, and to encourage greater use of the automated Special Clearance (SPECLE) list as a management tool. In this connection, I would like to have by 10 July 1977 any suggestions from you or your Program managers as to what types of information, what format and what frequency they would find useful in the SPECLE report. *S/ST*

/s/ Stansfield Turner

STANSFIELD TURNER

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